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BAKER v. CARR ABROAD: THE SWISS FEDERAL TRIBUNAL
AND CANTONAL ELECTIONS
F. WILLIAM O'BRIENt
ON March 26, 1962, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down
its decision in the Tennessee malapportionment case.' By a strange coincidence,
tvo days later the highest court in Switzerland, le Tribunal Fderal, pro-
nounced judgment in a case 2 whose basic issues were strikingly similar. In
each case judgment was in favor of plaintiffs claiming curtailment of electoral
rights by the respective local units of government-state or canton. In each
case the complaining citizens rested their challenge on an "equal protection"
clause. In each case there arose the burning issue of federal power versus state
or cantonal rights, and dissenting judges protested judicial interference in what
they asserted to be a purely local and legislative function.3 In each case the
great question of the nature of representation was involved, with the judiciary
virtually choosing between competing bases of representation and competing
theories of political philosophy.
Before enlarging upon these issues, a sketch of the major provisions of the
Swiss Constitution seems advisable. The Constitution of the United States has
sometimes been called "a bundle of compromises." The same might be said of
the Constitution of Switzerland. To understand the government of this tiny
Confederation, it is necessary to bear in mind that prior to its creation, the
cantons had existed as independent, sovereign States. The Confederation, which
came forth from the Convention of 1848, was the creature of their hands, and
the government thus established was a government of limited and delegated
powers.4 A further guarantee that cantonal sovereignty would not be destroyed
tProfesseur de Droit Constitutionnel, Universit6 de Fribourg, Fribourg, Suisse.
1. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Geissbiihler v. Fribourg, Grand Conseil, Tribunal Fdral, March 28, 1962, 110 J.
Des Tribunaux I, 271 (Swit.).
3. Le Tribunal F~d6ral, the highest court in Switzerland, does not publish dissenting
or concurring opinions but only the decision and the judgment of the court. But delibera-
tions are public so that the positions and views of all judges are generally well known. In
this article references to dissenting and concurring opinions rely upon newspaper accounts,
personal notes, and the notes of one of the participating judges used at the deliberations
and kindly loaned to this writer.
4. Article 3 of the Swiss Constitution reads much like the tenth amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. "Les cantons sont souverains en Pant que leur sonveraitiem
i'est pas limitei par la Constitution f&Irale, et, comme tels, its exercent tous les droils qld
ne sont pas diliquis au ponvoir fidgral." [The cantons are sovereign so far as their sov-
ereignty is not limited by the federal constitution, and as such they exercise all the rights
which are not delegated to the federal power.] The tenth amendment reads: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
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by the new union was made by the provision in Article 71 that the legislative
body would be bicameral, with the supporting assurance of Article 80 that
The Council of States is composed of forty-four deputies from the Cantons.
Each canton appoints two deputies. In divided cantons, each half-canton
elects one.5
Thus, while Article 72 establishes the National Council of deputies "in the
proportion of one member per 24,000 souls," Article 80 gives equal represen-
tation to each canton regardless of size or population.0
Prior to the adoption of the 17th Amendment in 1913 the United States
Senators were chosen by the legislatures of their respective states. In Switzer-
land, although there is no constitutional provision on this matter, the method
of election to the Council of States is completely under the control of each
canton.7 In four cantons Councillors are chosen by the cantonal legislature; in
fifteen and a half cantons the people vote by direct ballot; in two and a half
cantons the chore is entrusted to the Landsgcmcindc, the open-air meeting of
all cantonal voters held each spring in the town square. The cantonal legis-
latures likewise determine the terms of the menbers they send to the Council
of States. In three cantons the term is three years, in one canton it is a single
year, in the others four years. By contrast to the above, Article 73 provides for
direct election to the National Council and Article 76 fixes the term of deputies
at four years. Quite evidently, the Council of States was created to preserve
the federal feature in the government of Switzerland. As another concession to
the proponents of cantonal autonomy, only one federal court, not an entire
system, was established. Cantonal courts exercise jurisdiction over federal
matters.8 True to the political philosophy of legislative supremacy, the con-
stitutional makers did not bestow on the Federal Tribunal the power to declare
acts of parliament unconstitutional, and there is no evidence that the Swiss
entertain regrets on the matter.0 Consistent with their distrust of judicial
supremacy, the people have not given their cantonal courts authority to con-
trol their cantonal legislatures, except in the Canton of Geneva.10
5. Le Conseil des E'tats se compose de 44 daputis des cantons. Chaque canton notmme
deux diputis; dans les cantons partagis, chaque dcni-tat en 6lit un.
6. Article 84 underscores the "delegated powers" feature of Article 3: "Le Conseil
national et le Conseil des .Ptats dilibkrent str tous les objets que la presnte Constitution
place dans le ressort de la Con]fdration et qui no sont pas attribu&s d une autre autorit
f &ale." [The National Council and the Council of States deliberate on all matters which
the present Constitution places within the competence of the Confederation, and which are
not assigned to any other federal authority.]
The words "confederation!' and "federation" do not have the same distinct meaning in
Switzerland as in America. Note that in THE FEDERALIS PAzS, Hamilton used the
words with similar looseness.
7. HuruES, THEF FEDERA. CoNsrsrunox or SwIrzERLAND 88 (1948).
8. CODING, THE FEDR.L GovmEmRNMT O SWITZERLAND 110 (1961).
9. One attempt to add judicial review to the powers of the Tribunal was made in 1939
by popular initiative, but it was defeated in a decisive manner. Id. at 112.
10. Rappard, Le contr6le de 1a constitutionnalitb des lois fed~ales par le iugo amex
Atats-Unis et en Suisse, in 53 ZznmscHrTr FO"R ScHwnEmxzuscirms REcHT l1la n.104
(1934).
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The Swiss case under study here involved the system known as proportional
representation.' It will be best understood in reference to the majority system
prevalent in the United States and in Great Britain. Tennessee, for example,
is divided into 99 districts or counties, each of which elects one delegate to its
own House of Representatives. This "single-member district system" for elect-
ing legislators is generally cited as the major reason for the development of
the two-party system in the United States and in Great Britain, and for the
meager success of minor-party movements. If a political group can attract only
20 or 30 per cent of the voters, it can never successfully encounter the more
dominate elements within a district competing for the one representative. It
thus either disintegrates as a party or joins in coalition with one of the two
major parties, exacting concessions as its terms for the alliance. The "single-
member district" system contributes to the making of stable government. It
mollifies rigid doctrines and thereby helps prevent the fractionizing of society
into implacable dissident political sects. It removes from the law-making chan-
nels a major irritant and barrier, for it prevents entrance to the legislative
chamber of parties too small to govern but large enough to obstruct.
On the other hand, critics view this system as unjust and undemocratic. A
party may command the faithful allegiance of 10 or even 30 per cent of the
popular vote and still fail to obtain a single seat in the legislative body.12 It is
objected that every appreciable view in society should be reflected in a truly
representative government and that citizens should not be virtually compelled
to affiliate with other parties in whose political tenets they place only minimal
credence.
Out of such theorizing came proportional representation, the system where-
by the Swiss elect their National Council and at least seventeen of their can-
tonal legislatures. 3 It has many variations; the following example of the "list"
system demonstrates the workings of proportional representation only in its
least complicated form. Here each party presents to the voters a list of candi-
dates equal to the number of seats allotted to the district. If the district is
entitled to six representatives, and if three parties compete at the polls, the
distribution of seats will first demand that an "electoral quotient" be estab-
lished. For example, in Veveyse, one of the districts in Fribourg, suffrages for
three parties totaled 10,439 for the 1961 elections, and the quotient was thus
11. FINER, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GOVERNMENT 554-55 (1949), gives a
description of the system with a well balanced criticism.
12. These arguments have never generally commanded the attention of Americans,
Only 12 cities-Cincinnati being the largest-employ the system. After a ten-year trial,
New York City abandoned the plan in 1947. OGG & RAY, INTRODUcrioN To AmmucAN
GOVERNMENT 864 n.5 (11th ed., 1956).
13. There are some differences in the structure and powers of the several cantonal
governments, but in general the similarities are greater. All of the legislatures are uni-
cameral. The executives are collegiate bodies like the Federal Council, but elected popular-
ly. There are considerable differences in the structures of the cantonal courts, but since a
knowledge of neither their structure nor their powers is necessary for this article, the
matter will be omitted.
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1,739.14 The Conservative-Christian-Social Party with 4,665 votes (each voter
being entitled to six), was awarded two deputies. The Radical-Socialists with
2,166 received one. The Peasants and Independents Party won two seats with
its 3,608 suffrages. Since the Conservative-Christian-Social Party had the
largest remainder (1,187) after dividing its 4,665 by 1,739, it received the seat
not distributed in the first "round."
The case of Geissbiihler v. Fribourg, Grand Conscil 15 arose from the follow-
ing set of facts.16 The constitution of Fribourg was modified in January, 1921
by an addition to Article 36, drafted by the Fribourg Legislature (the uni-
cameral Grand Conseil), and submitted to the people. It read as follows, with
the 1921 addition italicized:
The legislative power belongs to a Grand Conseil composed of deputies
elected through electoral assemblies according to the system of proportional
representation.
To implement the new constitutional provision the Grand Conseil immediately
set about writing an elaborate electoral law which was enacted six weeks later,
on March 19, 1921.17 The pertinent section is Article 20, section 3 which
reads:
Any list which has not received a number of votes (party votes) equal at
least to 15 percent of the total number of votes validly written is elim-
inated from the apportionment.
The Grand Conseil for the Canton of Fribourg is composed of 130 deputies
chosen from eight districts (cercles lectoraux) for terms of five years. On
December 3, 1961, the canton held its quinquennial elections. In the District
of Singine the Conservative-Christian-Social Party won 84,011, or 93.4 per
cent of the votes.' 8 The Socialist Party received 5,923 votes, or 6.6 per cent.
Since this was far below the 15 per cent quorum, the Socialists were not en-
titled to any of the 20 seats allotted to Singine. But, according to a system of
"pure" proportional representation, the 6.6 per cent would have entitled them
to one seat. In the District of the Lac, with 15 deputies, four party lists were
presented at the polls. The total number of votes was 56,893 and thus the
quorum of 15 per cent was 8,533.19 Since the Workers and Employers Party
received only 7,085 suffrages, they fell short of the requisite number to entitle
them to a seat. Their 12.4 per cent, however, would have merited two seats in
a system unmodified by the quorum requirement.
14. BuLrzv- OFmr CEL DES SEAxCFS DU Gwm CONSEIL DU CAN'rON DE FRMioUna
[hereinafter cited as BULL. Du GRAia Coxsum], Dec. 1961, p. 967.
15. Tribunal F~d~al, March 28, 1962, 110 J. Des Tribunaux I, 271 (SvAt.).
16. BuLL. DU GwRn CONSEIL, Dec. 1961, p. 989. ExPOSE suR LES DELDlE.TIONS DU
GRAamr Co NsEI. Au Su-zr Da LA RFPREsEMNATioN PnoromioNn.r.a [hereinafter cited as
EXPOSE suR I.S DELIFRATioNS] (mimeographed) 1-9. (Material filed by If. Nordmann,
advocate for appellants in Geissbhiller v. Fribourg, Grand Conscil, supra note 15. See
dossier with court records, Tribunal F~dral, Lausanne, Switzerland).
17. Ibid. See also 1921 Bu.Lmr DES Lois DE FmouRG 75.
18. BULT. Du GRaN CoNsE , Dec. 1961, p. 956.
19. Id. at 960.
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The Conseil d'Etat (the executive body of the Canton) verified the election
returns on December 12, 1961.20 The Socialist Party of Singine and the
Workers and Employers Party of the Lac filed an appeal which both the Con-
seil d'Etat and the Grand Conseil rejected. 21 The plaintiffs appealed directly
to the Federal Tribunal, grounding their complaint upon three contentions.22
First, Article 20, paragraph 3, of the electoral law of March 19, 1921, eliminat-
ing any party not receiving 15 per cent of the valid votes, violates Article 36
of the Fribourg Constitution, which provided for a system of unqualified pro-
portional representation. Second, the law is arbitrary and offends Article 4 of
the Federal Constitution, which states that "All Swiss are equal before the
law." Third, it is contrary to Article 9 of the cantonal constitution, which
reads that "All citizens are equal before the law."
According to the Swiss rules of procedure, the Federal Tribunal is not
authorized to nullify a cantonal law, even though judged unconstitutional, if
an appeal is delayed beyond thirty days of its enactment.23 The Tribunal is,
however, empowered to set aside the application of the law in the case before
it. In Geissbilhler v. Fribourg, Grand Conseil, the court was thus restricted.
Its ruling was as follows :24 1) Article 36 of the cantonal constitution did not
inhibit the Grand Conseil from establishing a quorum as a modification of pro-
portional representation. 2) Article 36 did not permit a quorum as high as 15
per cent. 3) The decision of the Grand Conseil of December 27, 1961, reject-
ing the claim of the Workers and Employers Party to two seats by reason of
their 12.4 per cent of total suffrages in the District of Lac, is unconstitutional.
4) The decision taken against the Socialist Party in the District of Singine is
judged constitutional and need not be set aside.
This ruling commanded the support of five of the seven members of the
Tribunal, but the majority were not in full harmony on all aspects of the case.6
None of the concurring five was willing to state explicitly what per cent would
be an acceptable quorum. Judge Pedrini stated that "it would appear" that 10
20. Id. at 969.
21. Id. at 986-95.
22. Geissbiihler v. Fribourg, Grand Conseil, supra note 15, at 273.
On the right to such an appeal, see Loi FPDPRALF D'ORGANISATION JUDICAIRE, Art. 84a
(1943):
Le recours au Tribunal Fiddral est recevable contre une ducision ou un arrt6 can-
tonal pour violation:
a. De droit constitutionnels des citoyens.
Also Art. 85a:
Le Tribunal F~dral connait en outre:
a, Des recours concernant le droit de vote des citoyens et ceux qui ont trait aux
dlections et aux votations cantonales, quelles soient les dispositions de la constitu-
tion cantonale et du droit f~dral r~gissant la mati~re.
23. Loi FftDERAL D'ORGANISATION JUDicLun, Art. 89 (1943). See also Art. 87.
24. Geissbfihler v. Fribourg, Grand Conseil, .rtpra note 15, at 276-77.
25. See note 3 supra. For a newspaper account of the deliberations, see La Libert6,
March 30, 1962, p. 30.
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per cent would be acceptable and in accord with that established in other can-
tons. Judge Abrecht deemed that a quorum from 5 to 10 per cent vas justi-
fiable, but Judge Haeberlin reserved his opinion as to a quorum of 10 per cent.
judge Panchaud granted the admissibility of a "moderate" per cent. Judge
Deggeller agreed that 12.4 per cent was excessive, but he had, quite dearly,
great misgivings about infringing on the legislative authority of a canton and
suggested that the entire case be sent back to the Grand Conseil of Fribourg
for its reconsideration. When this motion was defeated, he went along with
the majority.
The two dissenters, Judges Favre and Pometta, spoke with one voice. The
interpretation of a provision in the constitution of a canton is exclusively the
right of cantonal authorities except in cases of flagrant violations. To admit
the appeal was to undertake a legislative function. If the Grand Conseil had
erred, the citizens had in their hands the means of rectifying the mistake, the
legislative initiative.26
In their arguments in the Geissbiihler case, appellants really asked for a rul-
ing on one point only.27 The electorate on January 30, 1921 had revised the
Constitution by a provision calling for proportional representation and with-
out adding any qualification to this provision. From this omission it was con-
cluded that the people had expressed themselves in favor of a "pure" system
of proportional representation. The two aggrieved parties thus concurred in
asking the court to declare that any modification of the system would be un-
constitutional, and, specifically, that the 15 per cent quorum law of March 19,
1921 and the decision taken in pursuance thereof on December 27, 1961 by the
Grand Conseil were de facto breaches of the amended Article 36. Although
the plaintiffs declared their ideological opposition to any quorum, small or
large, they admitted that their case would be totally groundless if the 15 per
cent qualification had been written into the Constitution itself.2 It is submitted
that the Federal Tribunal would have been more prudent and would have been
acting more in true judicial character had they addressed themselves to this
question alone. The judges instead attempted to make a distinction between
admissible and non-admissible quorums-a perilous venture which involved
them in airy theorizing on the virtues and values of proportional represen-
tation.
26. Art. 28ter. CoNsTrTuTIoN Du CANTON DE FRiBOURG: "6000 citoyens ont le droit
de demander rdlaboration, 'abrogation ou la modification d'une loL'
On the practical difficulties involved in employing this right, see NORDuA=N, EXPoSn
suR L-s FoRmms ExIGEEs PAR L'INITrATIVE Er L REFERENDU11 EN Dnorr FRm 0Oxs
(mimeographed, 1962).
27. Le recours de Droit Public, p. 13, Geissbfihler v. Fribourg, Grand Conseil, supra
note 15.
28. O s.RvAnioNs DFS RzcouRAN.ws, March 9, 1962, p. 1 (mimeographed) ; Records,
Geissbiihler v. Fribourg, Grand Conseil, supra note 15.
Geneva's constitution requires a 7 per cent quorum and the electoral laws in three
other cantons impose quorums as high as 10 per cent.
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The judges, with some plausibility, could have agreed with appellants on
the principal point raised, and answered the question in one simple statement:
Yes, the quorum requirement must be in the Constitution (either explicitly or
strongly implied). This conclusion does not lack supporting premises, for at
the time the revision of Article 36 was undertaken, there does not appear to
have been any discussion about modifying it with a quorum.29 Moreover, the
federal constitution had been amended just two years earlier to demand pro-
portional representation, and the National Council was first elected according
to a pure, unaltered system in November, 1919.30 It is not unreasonable to
conclude that this was the proportional representation for which the electors
of Fribourg thought they voted when they cast their ballots for a provision
reading almost verbatim like that so recently put into the Constitution of the
Confederation.81
A wise policy adopted many years ago by the Supreme Court of the UJnited
States is the policy of frugality in giving out free judicial advice not necessary
for disposing of the case at hand. The Dred Scott decision 3 2 and all the tin-
toward consequences that ensued are grim reminders of what departure from
this rule can entail. Had the Federal Tribunal of Switzerland exercised more
self-denial in the Geissbiihler case, its decision might well have been given a
more gracious reception and the court spared acrimonious criticism and loss
of esteem.3 3 From the immediate practical point of view, the difference would
have been minimal inasmuch as only one seat-that in Singine-would have
been affected. Thoughts on the virtues of different systems of representation-
subjects for inflamable debate-the high tribunal could have kept buried deep
in its own bosom. With one swift but unoffending stroke of the pen, the judges,
in effect, could have deleted the quorum requirement and invited the Canton
of Fribourg to express its will firmly in the Constitution, this time with greater
care and clarity. Instead the legislation is still on the statute books and could
be applied in the next election. At least Fribourg could, with impunity, apply
a 12.3 per cent quorum, for the Court's ruling was simply that a 12.4 per cent
quorum was too high. If so, appellants may have won the battle but lost the
campaign.
The court's "advisory opinion" was intended to suggest to the Federal
Tribunal a wiser and more justifiable course in changing the Fribourg law.
But the author of this article does not believe that the wording of Article 36
inhibited the cantonal Grand Conseil from enacting the March 19, 1921 electoral
29. See note 16 supra. Defendants apparently did not deny this point.
30. CODMING, op. cit. mupra note 8, at 75.
31. But see notes 51 and 52 infra and accompanying text.
32. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
33. La Libert6, the leading newspaper in the city of Fribourg, spoke out sharply against
the decision. (March 30, 1962, p. 30.) "Cantonal sovereignty is trampled under foot." Its
political editor wrote that "the people of Fribourg are under tutelage" and that "the
Federal Tribunal had violated the principle of separation of powers by its decision." Many
members of the legal profession stamped the court's decree as the activity of "political"
judges.
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law with the 15 per cent quorum. First, all seven members of the court ad-
mitted that the wording of the constitutional revision of January, 1921 put no
obstacles in the path of further legislative modification, even of a quorum
qualification.3 This admission, it seems, should have destroyed the whole
basis for the appellants' argument, which drev its strength largely from a
study of the legislative history of the constitutional revision, prior and im-
mediately subsequent to its adoption. In the study presented to the Federal
Tribunal,35 M. Nordmann, advocate for appellants, asserted that from May
23, 1919, when the first proposal for change was introduced in the Grand Con-
seil, until January 30, 1921, when the people of Fribourg voted to accept the
change, no mention was made in the legislative chamber of any kind of quorum.
During the debates on the bill immediately introduced to add this qualification,
three deputies of the Radical Party are quoted as asserting that a quorum
law would be contrary to the will of the people as expressed so recently at the
polls. One of these protesting deputies maintained that such a law would be
unconstitutional.
M. Nordmann concluded that the arbitrariness of the Grand Conseil is
especially remarkable since it enacted the law despite these protestations, on
March 19, 1921, only six weeks after the people had clearly expressed them-
selves in favor of a "pure" system of proportional representation. "0 It is sub-
mitted that the facts presented do not justify this conclusion, which seems to
be a transparent example of "begging the question." As a matter of fact, if the
limited historical study is put into its proper setting, the opposite conclusion
should have been reached. An American court, if presented with a law or
constitutional provision of doubtful meaning, would surely apply a rule of
"practical construction": what was done by Congress immediately after the
adoption of a constitutional amendment or the enactment of a law is viewed
as a valid interpretation of the doubtful texts. In the case of Article 36, it must
be remembered that the exact text of the revision was the product of the Con-
seil d'Etat and the Grand Conseil in November, 1920. According to the rule
of "practical construction," the conclusion should have been that the 15 per
cent quorum law was perfectly consonant with the amended provision in the
cantonal constitution.
This argument is greatly re-enforced by consideration of the channels pro-
vided in cantonal and federal law, whereby an efficacious protest could have
been raised at the time, had the electoral law of March 19, 1921 been a mockery
of proportional representation and a betrayal of public confidence, as appellants
and the Federal Tribunal characterized the work of the Grand Conseil. First,
any citizen in Fribourg could have appealed immediately to the Federal Tri-
bunal and asked for a declaration of nullity, for, according to Swiss law, it is
not necessary to show an actual personal injury as a prerequisite for an entree
34. La Libert6, March 30, 1962, p. 15.
35. ExposE suR Lzs DEtLIBATrONS, op. cit. sipra note 16.
36. Le recours de Droit Public, pp. 8, 9, Geissbiihler v. Fribourg, Grand Conseil, tupra
note 2.
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to the high court.37 Appeal, furthermore, must be had within thirty days 08-
generally before the law would have set executive wheels turning-in order to
elicit a decree of nullification. After that, only applications of the law in each
individual case are subject to review and possible reversal. Surely a deputy of
a minor party likely to be adversely effected by the quorum in the approaching
elections of December, 1921 had compelling reason to make such an appeal
had he seriously entertained doubts as to the constitutional infirmity of the
protested law.
Second, Article 28bis of the cantonal Constitution provides that "6000 citizens
have the right to ask for the elaboration, the abrogation or the modification of
a law." Since the revision in Article 36 had won overwhelming endorsement
on January 30, 1921, by a vote of 15,796 to 902, it seems certain that the spirit
of 6,000 Swiss citizens in Fribourg could have been aroused effectively to de-
mand an abrogation or modification of the quorum law had it in fact been a
clear mockery of the revision and an utter disregard of their expressed will.
But such action was neither taken nor suggested.
Third, Article 79 of the Fribourg Constitution provides, "The total or partial
revision (of the Constitution) may take place: 1, when it is asked for, follow-
ing the prescriptions of the law, by at least 6000 active citizens. 2, when it is
decreed by the Grand Conseil." It seems safe again to assert that if 15,796 Fri-
bourg citizens had voted for the revision, at least 6,000 could have been found
to amend out that which allegedly had "made a farce" of what the people had
so recently amended in. What strange fihn 3 0 was it that so enervated in
March those independent-minded Swiss spirits who had been so quickened in
January?
As mentioned earlier, the Court admitted that the Grand Conseil of Fribourg
could modify the system of proportional representation by demanding a quorum,
even though Article 36 carries no provision for addition of such a qualification.
The majority warned, however, that it was not permissible to dilute the method
by modifications which so change its "nature" that it could no longer be defined
as proportional representation.40 The Federal Tribunal ruled that a 12.4 per
cent quorum had produced the forbidden adulteration, while a 6.6 per cent
37. Loi F-DI-RALE D'ORGANISATION JUDICTAIRE, Art. 85, 88 (1943); HErVi, DE LA
QUALITE POUR RECOURIR DANS LA JURISDICTION CONSTITUTIONNELLE DU TRIBUNAL
FEDERAL 60 (1958). Also, Couchepin v. Valais, Grand Conseil, RECUEIL OFFIClEL DES
ARRETS DU TRIBUNAL FEDERAL 87, I, at 37 (May 15, 1961). In this case, the law was
enacted on November 19, 1960, and the appeal by a citizen of the canton was taken to the
Federal Tribunal on December 9, 1960, before the law went into effect. The Federal Tri-
bunal set the law aside. Thus a "virtual" interest or a lively "fear" of injury suffices,
In the Fribourg elections of 1956, the Socialists in the Lac district and the Peasants
and Independents in the Gruyere district each lost one seat by reason of the quorum, but
there was no appeal. 1956 BULLETIN DES Lois DE FRIBOURG 104, 107.
38. Loi FDEDRALE D'ORGANISATION JUDICiAIRE, Art. 89 (1943).
39. The "FObn" is a wind which, according to the Swiss, has strange effects upon
bodies and spirits, producing a feeling of apathy and weariness.
40. Geissbiihler v. Fribourg, Grand Conseil, supra note 15, at 274.
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quorum had not.41 Just how much solvent could constitutionally be added be-
fore debasement would be reached was a question the court's opinion left un-
answered.
The approach made by the judges to this problem is not entirely satisfactory.
It presumes that proportional representation has a specific "nature"--some-
thing that political scientists themselves might not admit. But, granted that it
has such a nature, is it the function of the judiciary to sort out and label the
several elements-there are others besides the quorum-that bring about the
prohibited dilution? In its quest for the "nature" of proportional represen-
tation, the court was forced to discuss the purpose of the system-and so it
would seem, to register the opinion that it is better than other electoral methods,
something not proper for the judiciary. It then singled out for condemnation
but one of the factors that can be a contribution to its "corruption." In this
part of its discussion, the court necessarily considered the "equality before the
law" argument, for the proponents of proportional representation generally
point out that its chief advantage over the majority system is that it gives equal
weight to every vote, no matter what the domicile of the elector. The court
admitted that splintering parties was a result of proportional representation,
that it made government by stable majorities difficult, and that the quorum was
a legitimate device to prevent a shattering of parties and an excessive multi-
plication of political groups. But the 15 per cent quorum went beyond what was
reasonable and defeated all the values for which the system was established.42
The Tribunal borrowed examples from the brief of the appellants to demon-
strate just how the "equality" clauses were violated and the votes of many
electors in Fribourg unfairly diluted by reason of the quorum.43 The adherents
of a particular party, observed the court, may be fairly large throughout the
whole canton, but under 15 per cent in one district. Nonetheless, according to
a system of unqualified proportionality, the electors in the latter district might
be entitled to one or two representatives, who, if joined to their brethren from
other parts of the canton, would allow them an effective role in the legislative
assembly. The electoral law of Fribourg, the court continued, theoretically
could exclude as many as 29 per cent of the voting population of a district be-
longing to two groups, appreciable in number, but each slightly below the 15
per cent requirement. In effect, they are stripped of their right to vote and
thereby denied equality under the law. Moreover, an assembly in which 29 per
cent of the voters in one or more districts have been excluded can scarcely
pretend to represent the electoral body on a proportional basis."
4
The court had other arrows in its quiver. The Fribourg law virtually com-
pels minority groups to conclude alliances to assure success at the polls, and
thus the elector is forced to give his vote to a party which he has no desire to
support. Liberty of association thus is restricted. In addition, said the majority,
41. Id. at 277.
42. Id. at 275-76.
43. Ibid.
44. Id. at 275-77.
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the delegation which is sent to the assembly from these parties of compromise
do not always give an exact idea of the strength or views of the respective
groupings that formed them. These drawbacks may be allowable for unim-
portant groups, but when it is a question of political parties, each of which is
almost 15 per cent of the electoral body, proportional representation in any
true sense is perverted.
It is difficult to accept the validity of these arguments. The same law was
administered without discrimination in all the districts of Fribourg for the
December elections of 1961. No matter how regrettable may be the failure of
the Workers and Employers Party of the Lac District to receive a single seat
in the new assembly, the result was not due to an application of the law which
differed from its application in another district. The votes of adherents to this
party in the Lac District were "diluted," "wasted," "uncounted" not because
of "unequal treatment under the law," but solely because of domicile-a factor
beyond the power of the law to control. In a like manner, a Republican vote
in most districts in New York City goes "uncounted" and a Democratic vote
in many upstate districts is "wasted." The words from Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Baker v. Carr seem appropriate :4
Appellants invoke the right to vote and to have their votes counted. But
they are permitted to vote and their votes are counted. They go to the
polls, they cast their ballots.... One cannot speak of "debasement" or
"dilution" of the value of a vote until there is first defined a reference as
to what a vote should be worth. What is actually asked of the Court in
this case is to choose among competing bases of representation-ultimate-
ly, really among competing theories of political philosophy-in order to
establish an approprite frame of government for the State of Tennessee
and thereby for all the States of the Tnion.
The hypothetical case presented by appellants, according to which 29 per cent
of the voters in one district could fail to receive a single seat in the Grand Con-
seil, can also be viewed with misgivings. But the same result is possible-in
some instances it is an actuality-under electoral systems in Switzerland in
which the Federal Tribunal could never find a constitutional infirmity. A 10
per cent quorum, which in Geissbilhler the court indicated it would probably
accept,46 could work the same type of "inequity" if each of three parties re-
ceived only 9.5 per cent of the votes.
The advocate for the appellants used the "equality" argument to support
the claims of both his clients, the Workers and Employers in the Lac District,
who had received 12.4 per cent of the votes, and the Social Democrats in the
District of the Singine, who had won 6.6 per cent in the December election.
But in the District of the Glane the Socialist Party also gathered 6.6 per cent
of the total suffrages and yet received no seat in the assembly, not because of
operation of the quorum, but simply because the Glane District has only 12
deputies, and 6.6 per cent of 12 is less than one. A more striking Case is that
45. 369 U.S. at 299-300.
46. La Libert6, March 30, 1962, p. 15.
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of the District of the Veveyse, which, because it is allotted only six deputies
in the Grand Conseil of Fribourg, has an automatic electoral quotient of 16.7
per cent. In the election of December, 1961, 47 to reach this quotient it was
necessary for a party to poll 1,739 votes, while only 1,565 votes were required
to attain the 15 per cent quorum. Here three parties presented lists which won
a total of 10,439 votes. On the supposition that Party A had received 8,695 or
83.5 per cent of these votes, it would have gained all six seats, even if Party B
had garnered 1,618 votes or 15.4 per cent and Party C 116 or 1.1 per cent. In
other words, although in the District of the Lac with 15 deputies it was an
unconstitutional denial of equal treatment under the law to withhold seats from
a party on the ground that it attained only 12.4 per cent of the vote, in Veveyse
it would have been perfectly in accord with proportional representation, and
therefore constitutional, to refuse seats to Party B, which won 15.4 of the total
votes cast.
If voters in the District of the Veveyse conclude that the electoral law there
is unconstitutional, they might urge the Grand Conseil to redistrict the Canton
of Fribourg and to give it more territory and more seats. But there is no way
to get a judicial ruling from the Federal Tribunal unless the case should
actually pass from the hypothetical to the real order.48 The aggrieved 15.4 per
cent might then appeal to the high court from a concrete decision of the Grand
Conseil. In the meantime, one can only speculate on how many of the doleful
happenings lamented by the Geissbiihler majority would have come to pass in
Veveyse-the forced coalitions, the denials of free association, the inadequate
reflection of political views in the cantonal legislature.
The weakness of the "equality" argument is further exposed by an explora-
tion of electoral conditions in the adjacent Canton of Vaud. Article 33, section
3, of the Constitution of Vaud, as revised in 1948, reads, "Election is held
according to the majoritarian system in cercles [electoral districts] with one
or two deputies and according to the system of proportional representation in
the other cercles." This restriction on the proportional system affected 17 of
the 60 districts. Surely, it might be asked, was this not on its face "unequal
treatment under the law?" And yet the Federal Assembly-whose decisions
are beyond the reach of the Federal Tribunal-had in 1948 given its stamp of
approval to this revision in the Vaud Constitution,49 as is required for all such
amendments by Article 85, chap. 7, of the Federal Constitution, and especially
by Article 6.
Perhaps the people of Vaud and its legislature recognized the injustice of
the 1948 provision. At any rate, in 1960 the Grand Conseil modified Article
33 to read in part :r
47. See note 14 supra.
48. Loi FiDLzAL D'ORGANISATION JUDIcrIREi Art. 89 (1943).
49. FAun.z FEDERArx III, 1169 (1948).
50. 157 REcum DES Lois ET DFcRETS DU CAxToN DE VAUD 23 (1960), and 158 id. 490
(1961).
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2. The canton is divided into 30 electoral arrondissements the boundaries
of which are determined by law.
3. The election is held according to proportional representation.
The decree of the Grand Conseil promulgating this modification begins, "For
the purpose of introducing proportional representation for all the deputies:
... ." Such a preamble is highly significant, and curious, because the legislature
thereby made proportional representation merely theoretical in many areas by
keeping thirty districts for a canton the size of Vaud. In 17 districts, as they
were later determined by law, there are five or fewer seats, in seven only three.
In districts with three seats, the quotient-a veritable quorum-is 33.4 per cent,
and in districts with four seats it is 25 per cent. Again, it must be remembered,
the Federal Assembly gave its blessing to the revisions in Article 33. Perhaps
the Grand Conseil of Vaud, working under the strictures of this 1960 pro-
vision, could have so drawn 30 electoral districts all of which would have a
sufficient number of deputies to make proportional representation a practical
possibility. Supposing this, and supposing that someone could bring an appeal
before the Federal Tribunal on the "equality" argument, would the court have
the daring to order the Legislature of Vaud to undertake a complete redis-
tricting of the whole canton?
In this connection, the case of Doser v. ValaLs, Grand Conseil 61 seems per-
tinent. Article 84 of the Valais Constitution reads thus:
The voting is by district, according to the system of proportional repre-
sentation. The mode of applying this principle will be determined by law,
In 1937 three parties competed for the four deputies in one of the districts.
One party with 65 per cent of the votes was awarded all the seats, although
another party received 19.4 per cent, and the third party 15.6 per cent. Accord-
ing to the cantonal laws of 1920,r a party not reaching the electoral quotient
is eliminated in the distribution of seats. Protesting application of the law to
themselves, the party with 19.4 per cent argued before the Federal Tribunal
that the law was contrary to the constitutional provision adopted in January,
1920.r, Appellants' thrust was powerful, for elections to the National Council
had just been held in November, 1919 for the first time under the "pure" pro-
portional system. Moreover, as appellants asserted, the Valais Grand Conseil
in its 1919 deliberations on the proposed amendment had pronounced itself in
favor of a system like that of the federal government. But in its Doser decision,
the Federal Tribunal rejected the appeal, asserting that the Grand Conseil
could not be charged with arbitrariness. It noted:
51. MS in the Records of the Tribunal F~d6ral at Lausanne, Switzerland. The ease
is listed in 63 RECUEIL OFFICIE. DES Lois ET ORDONNANCES 406, as a decision of September
17, 1937, but the opinion. and judgment have not been printed. Valais is a canton about
equal to Fribourg in population but somewhat larger in territory.
52. Loi SUR LEs ELECTIONS, Art. 12, 13, 14 (November 20, 1920).
53 MS, op. cit. supra note 51, at 6.
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[T]he concern in re-acting against an excessive dispersion of electoral
forces and against the splintering of parties, by favoring the more numerous
parties and at the same time seeking to attenuate electoral strife... is
legitimate in itself .... "
It seems strange that in the Geissbihler case the Federal Tribunal made no
mention of the Doser decision, either to reverse or to distinguish it.
The practical question of enforcement of the Gcissbiihlcr decree merits con-
sideration. In Baker v. Carr this question was of great concern, provoking Mr.
Justice Frankfurter to write :5r
In all of the apportionment cases which have come before the Court, a
consideration which has been weighty in determining their nonjusticiabil-
ity has been the difficulty or impossibility of devising effective judicial
remedies in this class of case. An injunction restraining a general election
unless the legislature reapportions would paralyze the critical centers of
a State's political system and threaten political dislocation whose conse-
quences are not foreseeable. A declaration devoid of implied compulsion
of injunctive or other relief would be an idle threat. Surely, a Federal
District Court could not itself remap the State...
Problems almost identical are raised in respect to the decision in the Geiss-
biihler case. Article 39 of the Federal Law on the Organization of the Judiciary
reads:
The cantons execute the decrees of federal judicial authorities in the same
manner as judgments passed by the power of their own tribunals.
In case of a failure to execute, recourse is had to the Federal Council,
which takes the necessary measures.
This is not very satisfying. If the Grand Conseil of Fribourg had failed to
award the two contested seats to the Workers and Employers Party, there
would seem to have been no way to break their stubbornness short of a dispatch
of troops by the federal executive authorized to arrest the recalcitrants in the
Fribourg assembly and to occupy the canton until compliance was forthcoming.
Fortunately, for the sake of law and order, the Grand Conseil did comply-
but only with the very letter of the court's decision. They deprived the Con-
servative-Social-Democratic Party of one seat and the Radical-Democratic
Party of another and bestowed them upon the Workers and Employers Party,
merely noting that the quorum was 12.4 per cent. 0
54. Id. at 12-13. In this election 5108 votes were cast, which, according to the Valais
system, resulted in a quotient of 1030. Party B, with 986 votes, .vas entitled to none of the
four deputies because of the special demands of the Valais law. Had there obtained in
Valais the quotient system used by the federal government-and also by Fribourg-Party
B would have received one seat.
55. 369 U.S. at 327-28.
56. Feuifle officielle du Canton de Fribourg, May 19, 1962, p. 413. Here are the possi-
bilities that are open to the Grand Conseil in the future: It could by a new law reduce the
quorum to 10 per cent or to some other percentage which it might deem acceptable to the
Federal Tribunal. It could consider the 12.4 per cent quorum to be the prevailing law by
court decree and continue to hold elections accordingly. Or it could accept the decision of
the Federal Tribunal as applicable only to the case involving the District of the Lac. Since
19621
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There remains for treatment here the question of the court's jurisdiction.
The Geissbiihler and Baker cases are similar in that neither involved a co-
ordinate branch of the same government, but only the legislature of a canton
or State. It would seem that in each case the respective federal court had juris-
diction, except insofar as it might care to limit itself out of judicial prudence,
respect for federalism, deference to the legislative will, or impossibility of en-
forcement. In the 1946 case of Colgrove v. Green,1 the Supreme Court of the
United States restrained itself upon the doctrine of "political questions." In
response to a claim that Illinois did not have a "republican form" of govern-
ment as required by Article 4 of the federal Constitution, the Court declared
that the matter should be handled solely by Congress, which under Article I,
sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution, is empowered to apply any necessary
remedies. Since the Congress, however, had not taken action against the legis-
lature of Illinois, but, on the contrary, had been seating Representatives from
the contested districts, the presumption that the State's government complied
with Article 4 prevailed. Had the Court rendered a contrary judgment, an
unseemly impasse between Congress and the judiciary could have resulted.
The Geissbiihler decision might possibly lead the Federal Tribunal to this
kind of impasse with the Federal Assembly. If somebody from Valid or from
other cantons with small electoral areas appealed to the Federal Tribunal on
the grounds that districts of three or four deputies make proportional repre-
sentation a practical impossibility, would they be told that the matter was
equivalent to a "political question"? By approving the Constitution of the
canton involved with its particular districts therein mentioned, had the Federal
Assembly already given its response and had it thus foreclosed the issue to
judicial determination? Certainly this would be the judgment of the Federal
the high court of Switzerland has no power to annul the quorum law of Fribourg (see
note 23 supra and accompanying text), the 15 per cent requirement is still legal and could
be utilized in the next election. Indeed, the law could again be attacked, but only by parties
adversely affected through an application of the law and only after the election returns
are in and verified by the Grand Conseil-i.e., in December, 1966. Since Swiss courts do
not bind themselves strictly to stare decisis (see Duns, PRAxis ANDERUNGE~T 9 (1949)),
an appeal to the Federal Tribunal might be given a reception in 1966 quite different from
that of 1962. This is not entirely impossible, especially since there is no certainty that all
or any of the five concurring judges in the Geissbiihler case would be appointed to hear
the appeal. Since the Geissbiihler decision has elicited so much criticism, even li judiclal
circles, a prediction of a reversal for 1967 is not too daring.
57. 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Article 73 of the Federal Constitution reads:
Les 6lections pour le Conseil national sont directs. Elles ont lieu d'aprfs le prin-
cipe de la proportionalit6, chaque canton ou demi-canton formant tin collfge 6lectoral
La 16gislation f6dgrale 6dictera les dispositions de detail pour l'application de cc
principe.
Since four cantons have only two deputies each and four semi-cantons have only one each,
the blessings of paragraph 1 of article 73 are entirely denied to them. Query: Does para-
graph 2 place an obligation on the National Legislature to bring them under the coverage
of paragraph 1, i.e., by a law redrawing cantonal boundaries? (In Switzerland, this ques-
tion is foreclosed to judicial determination. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.)
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Tribunal if anyone were so bold as to ask it to decide that the allotment of
seats to each canton for the National Council was a denial of "equality before
the law" to people in eight or ten of the smaller cantons. There is the slight
possibility that in the Geissbiihler case itself the court came dose, indirectly,
to infringing upon a prerogative of the Federal Assembly. Article 36 of the
Fribourg constitution did not receive its stamp of approval from the Parlia-
ment until June 25, 1921.5s The 15 per cent quorum law, drafted to elaborate
the constitutional provision, was enacted on March 19, 1921, two months
earlier.59 Is it possible to say that the Federal Assembly endorsed not only the
naked provision but the provision as already interpreted by the Grand Conseil
in its electoral law, which might then have been considered virtually a part of
that unadorned phrase in the constitution?00
Granted that the Federal Tribunal had jurisdiction-and this seems certain
-should not the court have been more eager to seek reasons justifying the
15 per cent quorum? Or, to put it another way, unless there could be no
rational grounds for such a law, should not the court have refused to declare
it unconstitutional? Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in the Baker case, wrote :01
And so long as there exists a possible rational legislative policy for retain-
ing an existing apportionment, such a legislative decision cannot be said
to breach the bulwark against arbitrariness and caprice that the Four-
teenth Amendment affords ....
These conclusions [that the policy was not dearly arbitrary] can hard-
ly be escaped by suggesting that capricious state action might be found
were it to appear that a majority of the Tennessee legislators, in refusing
to consider reapportionment, had been actuated by self-interest in per-
petuating their own political offices or by other unworthy or improper
motives. Since Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch. 87, was decided many years
ago, it has repeatedly been pointed out that it is not the business of the
federal courts to inquire into the personal motives of legislators .... The
function of the federal judiciary ends in matters of this kind once it appears,
as I think it does here on the undisputed facts, that the state action could
have rested on some rational basis.
Appellants in the Geissbiihler case spent considerable time arguing that the
quorum law was enacted by the majority of the Grand Conseil in order to keep
certain minority parties out of the legislative chamber, specifically the Socialists,
"the party of disorder."6 2 And the Federal Tribunal, it would seem, was in-
fluenced in its thinking by such charges of "unworthy motives." The court
admitted in the Geissbiihler opinion, however, that the desire to prevent the
disintegration of parties and the multiplication of groups are "pertinent
motives." "They justify even the principle of the quorum as one of the possible
58. 37 REvcUEn DES Lois FnEALs 536.
59. 1921 Buu.LE'm DES Lois DE FmBOURG 68-77.
60. These possibilities are offered purely as early speculations. They should not be
interpreted to indicate a commitment by the author, one way or the other.
61. 369 U.S. at 337-38.
62. Exposn sur L~s DEIBERATiONS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 7.
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modalities of the system of proportional representation."0 3 In the Doser case,04
moreover, the Federal Tribunal upheld Valais's unique quotient law, which
disqualified parties gaining less than 20 per cent of the votes, and in so doing
the court said that it was legitimate to "re-act against the excessive dispersion
of electoral forces ... by favoring the larger parties and at the same time seek-
ing to attenuate electoral strife."05
Relative to the motives which induce legislatures to enact quorum laws, it
cannot be said that such strictures are always demanded by the major party
and fought by minorities. To the contrary, a strong major party commanding
60 per cent of the legislature, with a clear-cut political credo which wins the
unwavering allegiance of all its members, may have no fear of defections in an
election under "pure" proportional representation. Indeed, it may actually
prefer such a "pure" system as a means of dispersing its political enemy. On
the other hand, the quorum may be welcomed by minor groups as the sole
means of salvation against the centrifugal tendencies within their organizations.
In an assembly of 130 members, the controlling party of 70 is quite invincible
by any force which splintered regiments of six or ten deputies under different
banners and divided counsels can send against it. But legislative campaigns may
be quite different if the majority were made to battle against a sizable party
of 55, all rallying behind an articulate leader with a consistent program. Or it
may be that the Socialists oppose the quorum rule in a district where they can
attract no more than 7 per cent of the vote, but support it in another district
where they reach a respectable 40 per cent. There being so many possible
motives which align legislators for or against modification of proportional rep-
resentation, it seems hardly proper for the judiciary to isolate one motive held
by some deputies and condemn the quorum because of it.
The final point raised in both the Geissbiihler and Baker cases concerns the
principles of federalism and democracy. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking against
the Baker decision, wrote :66
The fact that the appellants have been unable to obtain political redress of
their asserted grievances appears to be regarded as a matter which leads
the Court to stretch to find some basis for judicial intervention.
In the United States it may well be that when situations like that in Tennessee
develop, there is no remedy short of intervention by the judicial arm. But in
Switzerland abuses by the legislatures are not beyond correction by other
means. In Fribourg the people possess both the legislative and the constitu-
tional initiative, and with these two weapons at their disposal they could have
settled the "quorum" question without invoking aid from the court. Appellants,
perhaps, protested against the chaffing chores of soliciting signatures and the
63. Tribunal Fid~ral, March 28, 1962, 110 J. Des Tribunaux I, 271, 275 (Swit.).
64. 63 REcuzm OFFIcIL DE Lois ET ORDONNANCEs 406 (1937).
65. MS, op. cit. supra note 51, at 12.
66. 369 U.S. at 339.
(Vol. 72: 46
BAKER V. CARR ABROAD
dull duties required for putting the necessary machinery into operation. 7 But
it should be recalled that it was through an amendment that Article 36 was
revised in 1921, even though the Grand Conseil was dominated then, as now,
and to the same degree, by the Conservative Party. In the Gcissbilhkcr case
forty years after, the Federal Tribunal, presented with what it deemed a case
of denial of electoral rights, had two possible answers for the alleged infringe-
ment: correct the abuse by judicial decree, or leave it to the democratic process.
The judges elected the first. An observation by a respected professor of con-
stitutional law, Charles Fairman, commenting on Colgrovc v. Green, furnishes
vutatis inutandis, a fitting conclusion to this article:
[T]he Court might well reflect upon the consequences to which the two
answers respectively would lead. Would American [Swiss] democracy be
strengthened if equality in representation were secured to the voters by
judicial action, regardless of their own lethargy? Would the Court do well
to correct an old evil over which the legislative branch [the people] has
always had full power but which it has consistently failed to remedy?;s
67. Only once during the period of 40 years since 1921 had the people of Fribourg
attempted to use the constitutional initiative, provided by Article 79 of the cantonal con-
stitution to alter the quorum. That was in 1953, and the effort came to naught because the
proposal contained "a multiplicity of issues," which is itself a violation of the cantonal con-
stitution. Part 4 of the multiple project asked for lowering the quorum to 10 per cent. The
Federal Tribunal rejected an appeal from a decision on the Grand Conseil which had ruled
on the "multiplicity" issue. 1 REcumn. OFFiCaL DES ARRETs Du TRmUNAL FEnnv_.A 192,
202 (1955). See also NORDmANN, op. cit. supra note 26.
68. F. u-A, AFsmcAN CoNsTrruiox L. DE cisioNs 58 (rev. ed. 1950).
Note Mr. Justice Harlaes lament that the Court's decision in Baker "cuts deep into
the heart of our federal system." 369 U.S. at 301. Federalism was impaired in both cases,
but ir the Swiss case, democracy, as implemented by peculiar Swiss institutions, seemed
to be even more sinned against. In addition to the many similarities mentioned above, the
following deserves a word. Article 4 of the American Constitution and article 6 of the
Swiss Constitution impose a "republican form" of government upon the states or the
cantons. In Baker v. Carr, article 4 was clearly involved. See 369 U.S. at 297-307. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, remarked, "To divorce 'equal protection! from 'Republican
Form' is to talk about half a question." Id. at 301. In the Geissbithler case, the Federal
Tribunal said little if anything about this point. But when speaking before the Grand Con-
sell and in recommending rejection of the appeal on December 27, 1961, the chairman of
the special electoral commission spoke thus: "[T]he principle of equality before the law
must be examined in the light of Article 6." BULL. DU GRAxD CoNsis , Dec. 1961, p. 991.
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